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Regional Business Climate and Interstate  
Manufacturing Relocation Decisions 
 
 
Abstract 
Using a panel (2000-2011) of cross-state relocation patterns of manufacturing firms from 
the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) database we estimate a state-to-state relocation 
model for all manufacturers and separately for three groups of industries defined by knowledge 
intensity. The analysis of the data suggests that very few manufacturing firms relocate across 
state lines in any given year and the vast majority of those that do are small in size and move to 
adjoining states.  Econometric results reveal that regional determinants of relocation decisions 
vary by type of manufacturing firm.  Whereas a number of factors considered in this study are 
significant in the models, estimated marginal effects at the mean are infinitesimal. This implies 
that states attempting to encourage manufacturing firms to relocate from other states via 
traditional perspectives on business climate are unlikely to be successful.   
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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Encouraging manufacturing firms to relocate from one state to another remains a popular 
economic development policy at both the state and local levels.  To facilitate industrial 
recruitment state and local governments pursue a “positive business climate” through fiscal 
austerity, tax cuts, and other “pro-business” policies such as right-to-work legislation.  Within 
this policy context the academic literature, both theoretical and empirical, seeks to better 
understand if such policies are effective. This literature remains vibrant for two reasons: (1) the 
policy is popular amongst elected officials and (2) as our data and research methods advance, the 
empirical results and corresponding policy insights become more subtle and refined.   
From a policy perspective the contemporary “war between the states” tracks its origins to 
the Mississippi Balance Agriculture with Industry (BAWI) Act of 1933.    Building on 
contemporary export base theory and neoclassical firm location theory, Mississippi attracted 
northern manufacturers by promoting cheaper labor and land, lower taxes, and limited 
regulations.  The BAWI set the tone for how we think about business climate.  Since then states 
actively engage in economic development policies that attempt to create an attractive business 
climate defined by low taxes, cheap labor, and minimal regulations (Deller & Goetz, 2009; 
Eisinger, 1988; Ross & Friedman, 1990; Shaffer, Deller, & Marcouiller, 2004).   
While the conventional approach to the business climate is multi-faceted, taxes and 
public services are perhaps the most widely studied within the academic literature.  The early 
contributions based on work by Due (1961) and Oakland (1978) concluded that taxes had no 
impact on firm location decision because taxes were inconsequential in the accounting of profits.  
Since Wasylenko’s (1980, 1981) challenge of those earlier conclusions for a lack of theoretical 
and empirical rigor , a new line of research has shifted the consensus.  In a detailed review of the 
expansive literature, Bartik (1985, 1991, 1992) concluded that taxes and other factors commonly 
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associated with business climate do matter. Bartik’s work and that which followed indicate that 
taxes are a cost to companies and a detriment to the business climate, but at the same time, taxes 
fund services, such as education, protective services, and transportation infrastructure, that are 
vital to the production processes of firms and increasingly to the quality of life of the firms’ 
employees.  
Regional and local economic development policies designed to attract and retain 
businesses often target specific industries and sectors. High-technology industries and those 
characterized by intensive research and development (R&D) activities are a common focus for 
location incentives. In addition to promoting innovation and regional competitive advantage, 
such industries provide high-paying jobs and contribute to regional growth (Clarke & Gaile, 
1989; Jenkins, Jaynes, & Leicht, 2006). If manufacturing firms are perceptive to business 
climate, it is important to understand which components of the business climate different types 
of firms prioritize.  Within the product life cycle theoretical framework (Duranton & Puga, 2001; 
Hong, 2014; Mack & Schaeffer, 1993; Rink & Swan, 1979; Wojan & Pulver, 1995), industrial 
“maturity” determines companies’ preferences. Businesses in more mature industries, or 
industries less likely to invest in innovation, are likely to seek out lower cost alternatives while 
newer and more innovation-focused industries may place higher value on other factors. Hence, 
the effectiveness of business attraction policies critically depends on the understanding of how 
relocation determinants vary across industries. 
It is important to separate the study of factors that help understand relocation decisions 
from the study of the more general location decisions. As noted by Holl (2004), Hong (2014), 
Kronenberg (2013) and Manjón-Antolín & Arauzo-Carod (2011), many previous studies treat 
relocation, new firm formation, and new branch location decisions equally in broad 
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investigations of location choices, thus leading to potentially incorrect policy infrerences.  In this 
study we focus on the factors behind interstate relocation decisions in the U.S. manufacturing 
between 2000 and 2011.  By narrowing the analysis to existing manufacturing firms that relocate 
from one state to another we can explicitly compare and contrast the characteristics of the two 
states.  This provides a more powerful test of the traditional business climate hypothesis 
compared to the previous location studies that explore whether or not a particular type of firm is 
within a region. 
Using data from the National Establishment Times Series (NETS) database, we track 
individual firm moves across state lines annually in order to formalize and estimate differences-
between-states models1. The models take into account important regional characteristics, such as 
agglomeration economies or tax and unionization rates, of both the origin and destination state 
for each move. This approach captures state-to-state flows, and unlike studies that look at 
aggregate in- or out-migration, allows for a better understanding of migration behavior. To the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first to use differences-between-states technique in a study of 
business migration. In addition to the analysis of all manufacturing firms, we separately 
investigate how relocation incentives measured by tax rates and service expenditures may vary 
with the level of research and development intensity within various industries.  
Beyond these simple introductory comments the study is composed of four additional 
sections.  In the next section we briefly review relevant theoretical and empirical literature 
explicitly focusing on relocations. In section three we outline the theoretical modeling 
framework followed by the empirical model and estimation methods in section four.  In section 
five we outline the empirical results. We close with a summary of our findings and a discussion 
of their policy implications with a focus on broader manufacturing relocation patterns.    
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A thorough review of the firm location literature is beyond the scope of this analysis; 
instead we limit the discussion to the theoretical and empirical aspects of firm relocations. The 
research to date has mostly been concerned with business location determinants, whereas 
literature that investigates relocation drivers is underdeveloped. Only recently, with availability 
of new data, researchers were able to analyze the patterns and determinants of firm migration. 
The discussion of business relocation behavior is usually framed within three theories: 
neo-classical, behavioral, and institutional frameworks (Pellenbarg, Wissen, & Dijk, 2002). 
Profit-maximization is the cornerstone of the neo-classical approach, which is the most widely 
adopted theoretical framework. Within this view all firms are assumed to be rational decision 
makers with full information, and perfect ability to process information about performance 
prospects in each potential location. By monitoring differences between expected revenues and 
expected costs across space relative to the current site a company decides to move if doing so 
maximizes profits.  For manufacturing the “low-cost of doing business” is often more important 
for profit maximization than revenue streams.  
The neo-classical perspective applies particularly well to large companies, which are 
likely to adopt more sophisticated algorithms of new site selection (Greenhalgh, 2008) and to 
move long distances to escape locational mismatch (Kalnins & Chung, 2004), or exploit an 
opportunity (Stam, 2007). Empirically, studies of neo-classical relocation determinants focus on 
labor and transportation costs, market size, agglomeration economies and other, mostly regional, 
characteristics. The evidence suggests that companies are attracted by agglomerations (Erickson 
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& Wasylenko, 1980; Figueiredo, Guimarães, & Woodward, 2002; Giuliano, 1989; Strauss-Kahn 
& Vives, 2009), labor force availability (Erickson & Wasylenko, 1980; Giuliano, 1989; Schmitt, 
Gleason, Pigozzi, & Marcus, 1987), and access to transportation networks (Holguin-Veras et al., 
2005; Ozmen-Ertekin, Ozbay, & Holguin-Veras, 2007). 
The institutional approach to business relocations contends that the existing institutions, 
such as governments, real estate brokerage industries, and regional economic development 
organizations among others, play an important role in determining whether a firm decides to 
change its location and what region it will select. Like the neo-classical theory, the institutional 
approach is more applicable to large companies, those possessing negotiating power, because a 
decision to move is viewed as a result of negotiations with community, suppliers and other 
economic and social actors (Brouwer, Mariotti, & van Ommeren, 2004). At the same time, 
factors prominent within the institutional framework such as local policies and regulations, 
unionization rates, cultural norms (business-friendly cultural climate) and other regional 
characteristics are important for migration behavior of all firms regardless of their size. Although 
the empirical evidence is rather cursory, there are few rigorous studies that look at the effects of 
business relocation determinants within the institutional approach (Guimaraes, Rolfe, & 
Woodward, 1998; Lee, 2008; Oukarfi & Baslé, 2009)2.  
The behavioral perspective on business relocations focuses predominantly on the firm 
itself. Within this framework, a company is an actor with bounded rationality that does not 
possess all the information about business prospects in various locations and has limited ability 
to process that incomplete information. Firm’s characteristics, internal processes, levels of risk 
aversion, and willingness to accept uncertainty play an important role. The theory is particularly 
suited to study the relocation behavior of small firms, as well as short-distance moves. It can also 
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explain why relocation is such a rare phenomenon dominated by short-distance moves (van Dijk 
& Pellenbarg, 2000)3.  
In general, objective and subjective relocation costs increase with distance. These costs 
include those associated with uncertainty and the potential loss of employees, in addition to 
actual expenses of physical change of place. Research shows that risk and uncertainty decrease 
the likelihood of relocation (Pennings & Sleuwaegen, 2000). Companies considering a change of 
site, especially those investing heavily in their labor force, are less likely to move because 
employees may not change their residence in order to keep the job (Carter, 1999; Lawson & 
Angle, 1998; Otto & Dalbert, 2010). Like employees, companies are often ‘embedded’ in their 
locations for personal reasons, such as existing networks (Knoben & Oerlemans, 2008), or 
attachment of the owners or managers to a particular place  (Halstead & Deller, 1997). This is 
especially true for smaller companies whose decision process is more likely to be dominated by 
one person (Greenhalgh, 2008). The value of staying in the home community is so high that in 
some circumstances entrepreneurs may be willing to face much higher costs of doing business 
(Figueiredo et al., 2002). 
With respect to firm characteristics, size and age on average hamper proclivity to move 
(Brouwer et al., 2004; Knoben & Oerlemans, 2008; Nguyen, Sano, Tran, & Doan, 2013; van 
Dijk & Pellenbarg, 2000), although this does not apply to international business migration and 
migration of headquarters (Pennings & Sleuwaegen, 2000; Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 2009). At the 
same time, expansion is one of the major triggers of (short-distance) relocations (Brouwer et al., 
2004; Knoben & Oerlemans, 2008; van Dijk & Pellenbarg, 2000). Firms may simply outgrow 
their existing facility and relocate to larger premises often within the same community. 
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This study draws insight from all three relocation frameworks described above. It focuses 
on interstate migration flows, which are considered long-distance moves. Such relocations are 
usually triggered by regional factors (Weterings & Knoben, 2013). The neo-classical and 
institutional perspectives therefore, provide the foundation for this study but with influence from 
the behavioral approach. Empirically, our estimation strategy takes into account regional 
characteristics of both the origin and destination states. We use the differential between the 
origin and destination on several key variables to more precisely measure the incentives to 
relocate. We analyze the full set of manufacturing relocations as well as three subsets 
distinguished by their knowledge intensity, which is inevitably linked to the non-uniform 
distribution of perceptions and abilities among companies well in line with the behavioral 
framework. The variability in perceptions and abilities (together with other factors) should shape 
business migration propensity and relocation patterns. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The research on business climate metrics and manufacturing migration seldom 
distinguishes between location and relocation determinants (Holl 2004; Kronenberg 2013; 
Manjón-Antolín & Arauzo-Carod 2011).  Location decisions include both relocation and new 
start-up decisions.  Analysis of manufacturers by Conroy and Deller (2014), Halstead and Deller 
(1997) and Pellenbarg, Wissen and Dijk (2002) finds that most manufacturers stay in their 
original location because the owner is not inclined to change the place of his or her residence. 
Indeed, most manufacturing firms never relocate.  Thus, studies that blend the relocation 
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decision made by incumbents with the startup location decisions by new companies are ignoring 
potentially important differences in the two types of decisions.   
A more precise understanding of the factors that motivate relocation requires modeling 
the movement of established firms from one location to another.  We implement a state-to-state 
migration modeling approach in this study. Its advantage is the ability to directly compare the 
characteristics of the origin and destination states and to draw inferences based on the 
differential.  Although such a ‘differences’ modeling technique has been used in population 
migration studies recently (Ali, Partridge, & Rickman, 2012; Betz & Partridge, 2013), to the best 
of our knowledge, we are the first to apply this approach to the study of business relocations.  
Building on neo-classical theory, the firm location literature often focuses on cost 
minimization policies implying that those locations that maximize profits via the lowest cost are 
most attractive and correspond to a high rate or count of in-migration.  We argue, however, that 
relocation incentives are more precisely measured with a differences approach.  If conventional 
recruitment strategies are correct, the propensity for a firm to move should increase with the tax 
rate differential between the origin and destination states.   Thus, we expect that low tax states 
are attractive to manufacturers only to the extent that taxes in the destination state are lower than 
the taxes in the firm’s origin state.  This intuition implies that, all else equal, firms in high-tax 
states have greater incentive to move to the lowest-tax state than do firms already in a state with 
moderately low taxes. Thus, the differences approach allows for a more precise specification 
because it better measures the incentives for moving. Further, the empirical model based on 
differences approach allows us to include both taxes and expenditures without concern for 
collinearity. 
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Consider a profit maximizing manufacturing firm  𝑖  that is currently at location 𝑘 and is 
considering relocation over a range of regions (states) 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝐾4. The firm faces prices for 
inputs 𝑤!!, the firm’s output 𝑝!!, a level of taxes 𝑡!! and corresponding level of public services 𝐺!! 
all at the current location 𝑘.  Its profit function can be expressed as: 
𝜋!!(𝑤!! ,𝑝!! , 𝑡!! ,𝐺!!).      
In a potential destination region (state) 𝑘! this firm faces an alternative profit: 
     𝜋!!! 𝑤!!! ,𝑝!!! , 𝑡!!! ,𝐺!!! .    
The firm will decide to relocate if the expected profits of moving to a new location (state), 
expressed as 𝐸(𝜋!!!) exceeds the expected profit from remaining at its current location, 𝐸 𝜋!! .  
To simplify assume that market for the manufacturing firm’s product is not affected by the firm’s 
ultimate location, or 𝑝!!! =   𝑝!!.  The expected profit functions at the two locations can be 
expressed as: 
 𝐸 𝜋!! =   −𝛽!   𝑤!! −   𝛼!𝑡!! +   𝛾!𝐺!! +   𝜖!!      
and 𝐸 𝜋!!! = −𝛽!!   𝑤!!! −   𝛼!!𝑡!!! +   𝛾!!𝐺!!! +   𝜖!!!   
where 𝜖!! , 𝜖!!!~𝑁(0,𝜎!) and 𝛽! ,𝛽!!, 𝛼! ,𝛼!!, 𝛾! , 𝛾!!>0. 
The firm will elect to move if:  
𝑀!,!! = 𝐸 𝜋!!! −   𝐸 𝜋!! > 0     
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To further simplify the formal presentation of the theoretical framework assume that the 
parameters of the expected profit functions are the same across firms and locations, or 𝛽! = 𝛽!!, 𝛼! = 𝛼!! and 𝛾! =   𝛾!!.  This allows us to rewrite the decision rule to stay at the current 
location or to move as: 
𝑀!,!! = −𝛽∗ 𝑤!! − 𝑤! − 𝛼∗ 𝑡!! − 𝑡! + 𝛾∗ 𝐺!! − 𝐺! + 𝜖  
where 𝜖 = 𝜖!! −   𝜖!.  In the simplest sense the firm is comparing and contrasting the costs (𝜔, 𝑡) 
of the two locations along with the benefits of the public services being offered (𝐺). 
 Given the neo-classical foundation adapted, this framework provides a theoretical 
justification for promoting low costs of operations, as firms will prefer low cost alternatives for a 
given level of public services.  Indeed, within this framework the insights from behavioral and 
institutional theories of firm location can be tapped to help explain the observed dynamics of 
business moves (Brouwer et al., 2004; Nguyen et al., 2013; Pellenbarg et al., 2002).  For 
example, firm characteristics, such as age, market power, knowledge intensity and others 
determine its ability to benefit from the environment via local knowledge spillovers. Such 
ability, in turn, is often related to greater productivity and innovation (Ibrahim, Fallah, & Reilly, 
2009; Koo, 2005; Zachariadis, 2003), which are likely to contribute to cost reduction.   
The ability to gather and process information about all potential locations and willingness 
to assume risk and accept certain levels of uncertainty further complicates the decision rule 
outline above.  Rather than assuming that the parameters of the expected profit functions are the 
same across all locations (𝛽! = 𝛽!!, 𝛼! = 𝛼!! and  𝛾! =   𝛾!!) it is likely that firms will 
discount the values at potential location 𝑘!.  Given the institutional and behavioral theories it is 
Page	  |	  	  
	  
13	  
more likely that 𝛽! > 𝛽!!, 𝛼! > 𝛼!! and 𝛾! >   𝛾!! reducing the likelihood of a relocation.  
Intuitively, the variance around the expected profitability at a new location 𝐸 𝜋!!!  is larger 
than where the firm is currently located 𝐸 𝜋!!  again reducing the likelihood of a relocation. This 
is particularly true for more risk adverse manufacturers and smaller firms that lack negotiating 
power. The derivation above does not include the costs of relocation. For many types of 
manufacturing moving equipment can be prohibitive further reducing the likelihood of 
relocation.  In essence, manufacturing firms may not be as freely mobile as implied by the 
traditional neo-classical framework 
 
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
The empirical representation can be expressed for our panel of data as: 
𝑀!",! = 𝜃!!!!! ∆𝑥!,!"# +   𝑁!,! +   𝑇! + 𝜀   
where 𝛥xl,ij a is the difference between state 𝑖 and state 𝑗 across a set of 𝑙  empirical variables in 
year 𝑡, 𝑁 is a dummy variable that equals to one if two states are neighbors, and T is a time fixed 
effect. We model relocation (𝑀!",!) as the actual flow or movement from state 𝑖 to state 𝑗.  
Because of the count nature of our data, a Poisson or negative binomial estimator is most 
appropriate. To allow for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity we elect to use the negative 
binomial estimator5. By design the distribution of the dependent variable (𝑀!",!) is truncated at 
zero. Specifically, we are modeling incidents of positive movement between any two states and 
thus only positive integers are within the space of the dependent variable.   
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As demonstrated in Figure 1, there are 8,750 origin-destination state pairs with positive 
relocation counts over the study period.  There is just one firm moving between most origin -
destination state pairs in any given year accounting for 51.1 percent of the observations.    For 
example, in 2010 one manufacturer relocated from Alabama to Arizona.  The second most 
common scenario of two relocations between any two states accounts for 19.8 percent of the 
observations.  The largest relocation count is 62 firms that moved from New York to New Jersey 
in 2009.  Overall, movement from New York to New Jersey accounts for the five largest 
relocation flows with 49 firms in 2004; 51 in 2001; 52 in both 2000 and 2003.  But it is 
important to note that the relocation flows move in both directions.  While the largest relocation 
flows are from New York to New Jersey, there are also manufacturers moving from New Jersey 
to New York: 32 in 2011, 31 in 2004, 30 in both 2008 and 2009 and 29 in 2003.   
 
Given the distribution of relocations described in Figure 1 we use a truncated negative 
binomial estimator: Pr 𝑌 = 𝑦   𝑦 > 0, 𝜇,𝛼) =    !" !  !  !     !)!!!" !!!     !)        
where Pr(𝑌 = 0     𝜇,𝛼 = (1+ 𝛼𝜇)!!!! and the conditional expected value of 𝑦 is given by E 𝑦   𝑦 > 0, 𝜇,𝛼) = 𝐸 𝑦     𝛼𝜇)/[1− 𝑃𝑟𝑜 𝑦 = 0   𝜇,𝛼)].  𝜇  is the negative binomial parameter to 
be estimated and 𝛼 > 0 is a dispersion parameter. As 𝛼 → 0 the negative binomial model 
converges to the Poisson model.  A property of the negative binomial is that the conditional 
variance 𝑉 𝑦 𝜇 =   𝛼 + 𝛼𝜇!exceeds conditional mean 𝐸 𝑦 𝜇 =   𝜇. 
 
The model is estimated via maximum likelihood and the log-likelihood function is given 
by: 
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ℓ𝓁 𝛽,𝛼 = Σ!!!! Σ!!!! ln 𝑗 + 𝛼!! − 𝑙𝑛𝑦!!− 𝑦! + 𝛼!! ln  )1+ 𝛼𝜇)+   𝑦!   ln  𝛼𝜇 − ln  [1− (1+ 𝛼𝜇)!!!!]  
 
where Σ!!!! ln 𝑗 + 𝛼!! = 𝑙𝑛Γ( 𝑗 + 𝛼!! − 𝑙𝑛Γ 𝛼!!   if 𝑦! is an integer and Γ ∙  is a gamma 
function. 
Treating manufacturing as one industry in any study of relocation determinants may lead 
to aggregation bias.  We know from a theoretical perspective that, for example, within the 
product life cycle framework (Duranton & Puga, 2001; Hong, 2014; Mack & Schaeffer, 1993; 
Rink & Swan, 1979; Wojan & Pulver, 1995), firms at different levels of “maturity” view 
business climate through very different lenses.  More mature industries look for lower cost 
alternatives while newer industries may place higher value on other factors. Duranton and Puga 
(2001) report that relocation patterns are identifiable along the R&D continuum in an 
examination of French manufacturers. As long as the level of innovation within an industry is 
related to its maturity, this finding is well in line with the product life cycle hypothesis. Thus, for 
this study we divide all manufacturing industries into three groups based on their spending on 
research and development. We then look at the relocation decisions of all manufacturers as a 
whole and across three classifications: low, medium, and high R&D intensity. 
Our empirical specification includes several variable categories: (1) size and 
agglomeration metrics, (2) labor characteristics, (3) energy costs, (4) taxes, (5) government 
services, and (6) indicators of the state business and political environment.  The existing research 
commonly confirms the importance of agglomeration economies for relocation decisions with 
concentrations of firms in one industry attracting other companies within same industry (Deller, 
2009; Figueiredo et al., 2002; Schaffer, Deller, & Marcouiller, 2004; Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 
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2009). To account for potential agglomeration effects the models estimated in this study include 
the share of state total employment in manufacturing.  In line with expansive literature, we 
expect that states with more intensive manufacturing would attract manufacturing firms from 
regions that are characterized by lower concentration of this sector (e.g. Asheim, Cooke, & 
Martin, 2006; Pitelis & Pseiridis, 2006; Shields, Barkley, & Emery, 2009; Sugden, Wei, & 
Wilson, 2006; Woodward & Guimarães, 2009). To capture the size of manufacturing sector in a 
state we include the state’s share of US gross domestic product within manufacturing. 
 We include state-wide annual compensation within manufacturing in our specifications to 
control for labor costs faced by companies in the origin and destination states. After controlling 
for the effects of agglomeration, higher labor costs (compensation rates) are expected to deter 
manufacturers from relocating. Several studies find that labor unions generally deteriorate 
regional business climate (Bartik, 1985; Woodward & Rolfe, 1993): higher rates of unionization 
are associated with lower in-migration of firms (Conroy, Deller, & Tsvetkova, 2015; Lee, 2008).   
Still some studies, such as Bellace (2014), argue that declining membership in labor unions has 
undermined the relationship between unionization and manufacturing location patterns identified 
by prior research that needs to be revisited.    
 The availability of labor with relevant skills undoubtedly factors into the migration 
decision of firms (Ozmen-Ertekin et al., 2007). We include share of the adult population (age 25 
and over) with at least a Bachelor’s degree, but offer no universal hypothesis.   In the context of 
manufacturing, the required skill levels of the workforce likely differ across industries. The 
manufacturing sector consists of the industries heavily reliant on the low-skill labor and 
industries that require highly trained and educated employees. Along the R&D continuum the 
former are likely to spend very little on research and development, whereas the latter are likely to 
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be knowledge-intensive. We expect the effects of the education variables to vary across the 
models that focus on different levels of R&D intensity.  In low R&D spending sectors, there may 
be little need for educated researchers and more generally skilled workers, thus an educated 
workforce would have little, if not a negative, effect. Firms in the sectors characterized by high 
R&D intensity are more likely to rely on highly trained workers, thus an educated workforce 
would attract more knowledge-intensive firms. In addition to education, unemployment captures 
the level of economic hardships in a state but it also may signal availability of (cheap) labor. We 
expect this variable to play a role for relocations of less knowledge-intensive establishments. 
Energy costs, particularly the cost of electricity, often are a sizable component of the 
operations costs in manufacturing and, hence, should be important consideration in relocation 
decisions (Carlton, 1983). In a policy context, some policy makers question alternative energy 
sources, such as wind and solar, because the associated higher costs may negatively impact the 
business climate.  Though some studies find that energy costs are insignificant in the models of 
location (Bartik, 1985; McConnell & Schwab, 1990), we include the state-wide average 
electricity rate as a measure of input costs that vary regionally. 
 Government taxation and service provision are crucial elements of regional business 
climate. High taxes, regardless of the services they fund, are usually unattractive to businesses. 
Though early reviews conclude that taxes have no impact on firm location decisions (see Due, 
1961; Oakland, 1978), later analysis based on more rigorous theoretical and empirical modeling 
provides evidence that taxes matter for economic growth. Despite this fact, some commentators 
note that the effects of taxes “should be treated as an open rather than a settled question” 
(Newman & Sullivan, 1988, p.232). We provide further investigation of the impacts of taxes in 
the context of manufacturing firm relocations. The models estimated in this study include three 
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types of taxes: corporate income taxes, personal income taxes, and property taxes. To control for 
the size of the state economy, we adjust each type of revenue by total personal income.  
 Our modeling strategy allows for inclusion of both taxes and expenditures in the same 
specification. This feature of the model is valuable because just a few studies consider how tax 
revenues are used to fund public services, which may also impact business migration. Based on 
the current state of the literature one can conclude that taxes have a negative, although weak, 
effect on economic activity giving some credence to the notion that high taxes deteriorate 
business climate.  Yet, taxes pay for public education, which is vital to the productivity of the 
workforce, and for the transportation infrastructure that is an important consideration in business 
relocation decisions (Holguin-Veras et al., 2005; Ozmen-Ertekin et al., 2007).  We expect 
education expenditures to have a positive impact on migration as improvements in human capital 
can have utility to a variety of firms. Human capital investments, such as public education, on-
the-job training, and health care among others, influence the economic growth process by 
increasing the productive capacity of the labor force by augmenting skills, knowledge, health, or 
other productive attributes (Beaulieu & Mulkey, 1995; Clark, 1983; Goetz & Hu, 1996; 
Hanushek & Woessmann, 2015; Wilson & Briscoe, 2004). 
 Public capital and public infrastructure in particular are crucial for a variety of economic 
outcomes (Aschauer, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c; Holtz-Eakin, 1992; Tatom, 1991a, 1991b). Like 
Bergh and Henrekson (2011), Bartik (1991, 1992) and Barro (1991), we take the view that public 
capital is broader than simple physical infrastructure and includes “productive” public amenities 
such as protective services and environmental protection. We assume that there is a balance 
between the potentially negative effects of taxation, which can hinder business climate, and the 
positive effects of productive public goods and services, which are intended to promote the 
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business climate. Thus, in addition to our tax variables, we have three broad measures of what 
we suggest are productive public goods: expenditures on higher education, expenditures on K-12 
education, and expenditures on highways and transportation.  We include two non-productive 
expenditure categories: welfare, including public expenditures on health care, and corrections, 
including police, jails and prisons.   As with the taxation variables, these measures are per $1,000 
of personal income. 
Another set of variables focuses on the political environment in a state.  As suggested by 
the institutional theory of business (re)locations, public institutions play an important role in the 
migration behavior of firms. Some research suggests that the Democratic Party may be perceived 
as less “business-friendly” (Grant, 1996; Klassen & Shackelford, 1998) potentially deterring in-
migrating companies. Democrats tend to favor higher funding for government services over 
lower taxes, a stronger regulatory environment and pro-labor policies. We expect manufacturers 
to be less likely to be drawn to majority-Democratic states.  We include the percent of state 
legislative seats that are held by Democrats to capture the effects of party politics. Because 
political conflict can add uncertainty to business climate and uncertainty is costly to relocating 
firms (Pennings & Sleuwaegen, 2000) we include the rate at which governors use their veto 
authority in the models. We expect businesses to be less likely to relocate to a state with higher 
levels of political conflict. 
 In addition to the variables described above our models include the Beacon Hill 
Competitiveness Index. State and local media along with economic development practitioners 
tend to draw attention to the rankings that appear to make a region look particularly attractive.  
Rankings, such as Money Magazine’s “Best Places to Live” or Forbes Magazine’s “Best States 
for Business” or the various rankings offered by Site Selection Magazine, are widely used as a 
Page	  |	  	  
	  
20	  
form of boosterism in promotion of favorable business climate to outsiders.  While these types of 
rankings are widely dismissed in the academic literature (e.g. Lane, Glennon, & McCabe, 1989) 
we include the Beacon Hill Competitiveness Index for completeness.  The advantage of the 
Beacon Hill Index is that it is available over the period of analysis for this study and is relatively 
consistent in methodology from one year to the next.    We expect manufacturers to be attracted 
to states with higher values of the Index. 
 We also include a dummy variable to control for relocations between neighboring states.  
In a descriptive analysis of the NETS data focusing on Wisconsin, Conroy and Deller (2014) find 
that the vast majority of firms that relocate out of state move to an adjacent state.  Often these 
moves are simply across the state line. Neumark et al. (2006) provide comparable evidence for 
the state of California. This makes intuitive sense within the behavioral approach to firm 
relocations: as a company moves farther from the current location, information costs become 
higher, as well as the variance of error in the expected profit function.  For these reasons we 
expect a higher proportion of manufacturing firms to relocate to nearby states.  
Finally, the factors that are considered in relocation decisions may differ across 
manufacturing firms.  The product life cycle model (see Rink & Swan, 1979) implies that as 
manufacturing becomes more mature and less focused on innovation it seeks out lower cost 
alternatives (Duranton & Puga, 2001; Hong, 2014; Mack & Schaeffer, 1993; Wojan & Pulver, 
1995).  On the other hand, manufacturing companies in newer industries tend to be more focused 
on innovation and to benefit from Jacobian externalities associated with agglomeration 
economies.  It follows that the knowledge-intensity of industries at different stages of product 
life cycle is likely to differ. Using R&D spending data from the National Science Foundation 
(2014) we group manufacturing firms into three subsets depending on their industrial affiliation: 
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low, medium and high.  The firms in “low” R&D spending group are deemed less innovative and 
less likely to benefit from agglomeration economies. Consequently, their relocation decisions are 
expected to be primarily motivated by cost differential.  Firms within more innovation-focused 
industries are likely to be at a different point on the product life cycle continuum. Such 
companies (“medium” and “high” R&D spending groups in our study) should be attracted by 
agglomeration economies.  Our grouping of industries based on R&D spending is provided in 
Table 16, whereas Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the variables.  
  
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
To discuss the results, we follow the structure implied by the grouping of our variables 
and draw comparisons across research and development intensity throughout. For interpretation 
of the results presented in Table 3, one needs to keep in mind that the variables are measured 
relative to the value in the origin state: ∆𝑥!,!"# = 𝑥! − 𝑥!. This method implies that if the 
difference is positive, the variable takes on a higher value in the origin state i.  The dependent 
variable is the count of firms moving from state i to state j.  So, a positive coefficient combined 
with a positive value of ∆𝑥!,!"# implies more firms moved out of state i to state j. For example, if 
the coefficient on the tax rate is positive and significant and the tax rate in state i is higher than in 
state j, then the results indicate that more firms are moving from the high-tax state i to the low-
tax state j. That is, a positive coefficient implies that low values of a variable (i.e. corporate 
taxes) are attractive to manufacturing firms and negative coefficients imply that a higher value of 
a variable (i.e. spending on higher education) is attractive. 
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The size of the manufacturing sector plays a role in relocation decisions. Manufacturers 
tend to exit states with a high share of U.S. manufacturing GDP and go to those with a relatively 
low share.  This result holds in the pooled model of all migration, but seems to be driven 
primarily by medium and high research and development type companies. There is no significant 
effect among firms in industries with low research and development intensity. The observed 
results could be driven by the single state of California, which is the largest manufacturer in the 
country, but usually loses firms to other states (Neumark et al., 2006). In terms of agglomeration 
effects,  the share of state employment in manufacturing is weakly significant among high R&D 
manufacturers. The coefficient is negative suggesting migration is higher from states with a low 
share of employment in manufacturing to states with a relatively large share of employment in 
manufacturing. This result is consistent with the product life cycle model and the prior findings 
within manufacturing context (Duranton & Puga, 2001; Hong, 2014; Mack & Schaeffer, 1993; 
Wojan & Pulver, 1995).  It appears that more innovative firms, as evidenced by spending on 
research and development, benefit more from the Jacobian externalities associated with 
agglomeration economies. The benefits of Jacobian externalities to less innovative firms perhaps 
are not sizable enough to outweigh potentially higher costs associated with agglomerated spatial 
markets. 
Estimation results suggest that the only labor consideration relevant to manufacturing 
migration is the rate of union membership. Neither the unemployment rate, nor the share of 
population with at least a bachelor’s degree have any effect on manufacturers’ relocation 
decision, regardless of their research and development intensity.   Union membership, however, 
has a strong positive effect on migration flows across low, medium, and high research and 
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development groups, suggesting that firms leave highly unionized states in favor of those with 
lower union membership, a result that is consistent with the traditional view of business climate. 
Energy costs have only a weakly positive effect on relocation. In the regression pooling 
all firms and in that for high R&D firms, the coefficient is positive but only weakly significant, 
suggesting that firms leave states with relatively high energy costs for destination states with 
lower electricity rates.  Again, this result is consistent, although weakly from a statistical 
perspective, with the traditional view of business climate. 
The impact of taxes on manufacturing relocation varies both by the type of tax and the 
R&D intensity of the firms but seems to have the most influence on companies in knowledge-
intensive industries.  First, corporate income taxes have positive and significant effect on the 
migration of high R&D firms only.  Thus, at the highest levels of R&D spending, firms tend to 
leave states with high corporate income tax rates for destinations that have lower rates. In 
contrast, property taxes have a negative effect on migration among high R&D manufacturing 
firms.  The negative and significant coefficient indicates that firms tend to exit states with 
relatively low property taxes in favor of those with higher property taxes.  This may signal the 
importance of the amenities funded by property taxes to the owners and managers of firms in 
knowledge-intensive industries.  Last, income taxes have a positive and significant effect on the 
migration of low R&D firms and all firms pooled together.  As expected, the results indicate that 
firms leave states with relatively high individual income taxes.  
In general, spending on government services influences primarily low and medium R&D 
manufacturing firms.  None of the expenditures influence the subset of high R&D firms.  
Spending on higher education does seem to attract firms, but it appears that relationship is driven 
primarily by migration among low R&D firms.   The negative and strongly significant 
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coefficient indicates that low R&D firms tend to flow from states with low spending on higher 
education to those that spend relatively more.  Spending on K-12 education tends to correspond 
to more migration from states that spend more to those that spend less, but this result holds only 
for the subset of medium R&D manufacturing firms.  The negative and strongly significant 
coefficient in the pooled model on welfare programs implies migration from states with low 
welfare spending to states with high welfare spending.  While this is true for all firms generally, 
this result is not especially strong in any subset of manufacturers. Lastly, relatively low spending 
on highways and roads seems to be at least weakly attractive to low R&D manufacturers. 
Together, the last group of variables gives a sense of the state business and political 
environment.  First, despite its popularity as a recruitment device, the Beacon Hill 
Competitiveness Index appears to have no influence on manufacturing migration.  This is 
consistent with other studies that find that rankings like this provide little insight into actual firm 
location decisions (Lane et al., 1989).  Similarly, despite the pro-business identity of the 
Republican Party, and opposing image of the Democratic Party, the majority party of the state 
legislature has no influence on manufacturing migration. The rate of gubernatorial veto is also 
without influence.  
Overwhelmingly, manufacturing firms move to neighboring states.  This result is not 
surprising as information asymmetries increase with distance, thus short-distance moves are 
likely to be better informed and perceived as less uncertain. This makes such moves an attractive 
option compared with long-distance moves.  In fact, the majority of our variables that 
characterize various aspects of the business climate have remarkably smaller impact on 
migration than does the simple coincidence of neighboring locations.  
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 The coefficient estimates provided in Table 3 alone do not convey the magnitude of the 
economic effects of the explanatory variables on the count of firms that migrate between any two 
states.  Marginal effects give a better sense of how a change in any one of our policy variables 
would influence relocation decisions on average. For each specification the marginal effects at 
the mean are reported in Table 4.  Despite the statistical significance of several variables in each 
model, the marginal effects indicate that their economic significance is small if not trivial.  The 
marginal effects of the policy variables are several orders of magnitude larger for high R&D 
manufacturers, but still quite small in terms of economic importance.  For instance, the marginal 
effects of taxes imply that in order to increase the expected number of relocating firms by one 
states would need to implement massive tax cuts. 
As previously discussed, a very small share (1-5% depending on the source) of 
manufacturers move each year.  On average in our sample, fewer than three firms move between 
any two states per year.  The rarity of manufacturing relocations may partly explain the 
extremely small marginal effects.  More importantly, however, the small marginal effects 
combined with the infrequency of relocations have important policy implications.  While it is the 
case that unionization, taxes, and some public spending have a statistical relationship to 
manufacturing interstate migration, the impact of any feasible policy change related to any 
business climate components considered in this study is likely to be negligible.   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
With this study we contribute to the still underdeveloped literature that investigates 
business relocation determinants. Our focus on firm relocations, as opposed to the more general 
Page	  |	  	  
	  
26	  
question of firm location decisions, is motivated by the prevalence of state policies that try to 
attract companies from elsewhere coupled with very limited evidence on the effectiveness of 
such incentives. We focus on the manufacturing firms that changed the state of their location 
during the 2000-2011 time period as indicated in the NETS database. To better capture the nature 
of the firm relocation decisions, we use a differencing modeling approach, which simultaneously 
takes into account multiple characteristics of both origin and destination states, and examines the 
importance of these regional traits for all manufacturing firms, as well as separately for three 
subsets of industries defined by the level of research and development (R&D) spending.  
Given the preferential treatment often offered by states and localities to companies in 
knowledge-intensive sectors, the results of our study are particularly relevant to the discussion of 
attraction packages and business climate in general. We find that divergent sets of determinants 
shape relocation decisions within the studied groups. On average, manufacturers that tend to be 
more innovative, as proxied by spending on R&D, appear to be more likely to take into account 
regional characteristics, which may be welcome news for policy-makers. Such companies tend to 
leave states with larger share of U.S. manufacturing output in favor of states with lower share but 
prefer to relocate to the states whose employment is more concentrated in manufacturing. They 
are somewhat responsive to energy costs, avoid states with higher union membership rates and 
prefer to move out of states with higher corporate income taxes but are attracted to the states that 
levy more on property. This may point to the importance of amenities funded by property taxes 
to the firms in knowledge-intensive industries, although wider spending categories considered in 
this study do not influence their relocation choices. These results are rather expected if one takes 
into account the ability of such companies to draw labor from across the nation and relative 
unimportance of transportation infrastructure in their production process.  
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   On the other side of the spectrum, manufacturing establishments in the industries 
characterized by the low intensity of spending on R&D prefer to relocate to the states with lower 
unionization rates and lower personal income taxes. Companies in the sectors with low 
knowledge intensity appear to be the most sensitive to what we refer to as productive public 
capital. They are drawn to the states that spend more on higher education and transportation 
infrastructure.  
While we find some statistical evidence supporting relevance of the traditional notions of 
a positive business climate in manufacturing relocation decisions such as low costs of operations, 
the negligible marginal effects of the variables call into question the economic significance of the 
relationships between considered regional characteristics and relocation choices.  On face value, 
many of our findings are consistent with Bartik’s (1985, 1991, 1992) conclusion that taxes and 
other factors generally associated with business climate play a role in business location 
decisions. The magnitude of the marginal effects, however, is so small that earlier views of the 
tax policy ineffectiveness in determining location behavior of firms (Due, 1961; Oakland, 1978) 
seem to be closer to reality.   Thus “low road” approaches to promoting a positive business 
climate with the purpose of attracting companies from other states are not likely to be effective. 
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1 The National Establishment Time Series (NETS) is a database of U.S. establishments 
developed and annually updated by Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) in partnership with Walls & 
Associates.  The NETS database is uniquely detailed providing location information for each 
establishment, which is an important advantage over other available data sources. The data 
include the location of each establishment at its start, as well as the year and address of any 
relocation during the life of a business making it possible to track relocation decisions and 
migration patterns. Neumark, Zhang, and Wall (2006) find that the information on interstate 
relocations of establishments contained in the NETS is particularly reliable. 
2 This lack of a well-established rigorous empirical literature could be due to the difficulty to 
directly quantify many factors that are most relevant to the institutional perspective. 
3 This statement is applicable to headquarters to a lesser extent. Whereas relocation is a rare 
event for the majority of firms, headquarters appear to be more likely to move. Besides, the 
determinants of headquarter relocations seem to be different from other types of establishments 
(Strauss-Kahn & Vives, 2009). 
4 This derivation follows Grassmueck, Goetz, and Shields (2008). 
5 We used both estimators and found little differences in the final results.  Thus for brevity we 
report only the more general negative binomial results. 
6 This grouping is consistent with the model developed by Duranton and Puga (2001). 
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Table	  1:	  Industry	  Groupings	  by	  Research	  and	  Development	  Activity
NAICS Industry Grouping
311 Food	  Manufacturing Low
312 Beverage	  and	  Tobacco	  Product	  Manufacturing Low
313 Textile	  Mills Low
314 Textile	  Product	  Mills Low
315 Apparel	  Manufacturing Low
316 Leather	  and	  Allied	  Product	  Manufacturing Low
321 Wood	  Product	  Manufacturing Low
322 Paper	  Manufacturing Low
323 Printing	  and	  Related	  Support	  Activities Medium
324 Petroleum	  and	  Coal	  Products	  Manufacturing Low
325 Chemical	  Manufacturing High
326 Plastics	  and	  Rubber	  Products	  Manufacturing Low
327 Nonmetallic	  Mineral	  Product	  Manufacturing Low
331 Primary	  Metal	  Manufacturing Low
332 Fabricated	  Metal	  Product	  Manufacturing Low
333 Machinery	  Manufacturing Medium
334 Computer	  and	  Electronic	  Product	  Manufacturing High
335 Electrical	  Equipment,	  Appliance,	  and	  Component	  Manufacturing High
336 Transportation	  Equipment	  Manufacturing High
337 Furniture	  and	  Related	  Product	  Manufacturing Medium
339 Miscellaneous	  Manufacturing Medium
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Table	  2:	  Descriptive	  Data	  for	  Mijt	  and	  ∆Xijt
Mean Standard	  
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Migration	  (Count	  or	  Mijt) 2.677 3.57 1.00 62.00
Migration	  Share 0.065 0.07 0.00 1.00
State's	  Share	  of	  US	  Manufacturing	  GDP 0.052 4.20 -­‐13.37 13.37
Share	  of	  State	  Employment	  in	  Manufacturing -­‐0.072 3.99 -­‐14.24 14.87
Compensation	  per	  Job	  in	  Manufacturing 0.637 12.08 -­‐41.76 40.96
Union	  Membership	  Rate 0.481 7.88 -­‐23.80 23.80
Unemployment	  Rate -­‐0.033 1.68 -­‐8.80 8.50
Share	  of	  Population	  25+	  Years	  Old	  with	  at	  Least	  a	  Bachelor's	  Degree 0.398 6.24 -­‐19.00 21.90
State	  Average	  Electricity	  Rate 0.372 9.26 -­‐35.63 35.46
Corporate	  Income	  Tax	  per	  $1000	  Personal	  Income 0.076 2.96 -­‐13.41 13.41
Individual	  Income	  Tax	  per	  $1000	  Personal	  Income 0.477 16.76 -­‐49.06 49.06
Property	  Tax	  Per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income 0.502 11.76 -­‐50.38 50.38
Spend	  on	  Higher	  Education	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐0.161 7.48 -­‐23.30 23.68
Spend	  on	  K12	  Education	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income 0.133 9.60 -­‐39.52 43.64
Welfare	  Programs	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐0.002 12.05 -­‐45.36 46.12
Highways/Roads	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐0.067 5.06 -­‐22.20 21.89
Corrections	  Per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐0.002 1.97 -­‐8.06 8.06
Beacon	  Hill	  Comp	  Index 0.040 1.22 -­‐5.07 4.08
Share	  of	  State	  Legislature	  Held	  by	  Democrats 0.690 18.41 -­‐78.79 78.79
Rate	  of	  Veto	  by	  Governor 0.108 11.32 -­‐54.26 54.26
Neighbors 0.209 0.41 0.00 1.00
Number	  of	  Observations:	  8,750
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Table	  3:	  Empirical	  Modeling	  Results
All	  
Manufact
urers
Low	  R&D	  
Manufact
urers
Medium	  
R&D	  
Manufact
uers
High	  R&D	  
Manufact
uring
State's	  Share	  of	  US	  Manufacturing	  GDP 0.0113 ** 0.0049 0.0223 ** 0.0211 **
(0.0066) (0.0093) (0.0096) (0.0101)
Share	  of	  State	  Employment	  in	  Manufacturing -­‐0.0123 -­‐0.0024 -­‐0.0172 -­‐0.0242 *
(0.0097) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0142)
Compensation	  per	  Job	  in	  Manufacturing -­‐0.0014 0.0058 -­‐0.0068 -­‐0.0011
(0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0053)
Union	  Membership	  Rate 0.0241 *** 0.0236 *** 0.0349 *** 0.0162 **
(0.0046) (0.0060) (0.0065) (0.0073)
Unemployment	  Rate 0.0154 0.0200 -­‐0.0001 0.0248
(0.0190) (0.0252) (0.0265) (0.0280)
Share	  of	  Population	  25+	  Years	  Old	  with	  at	  Least	  a	  Bachelor's	  Degree -­‐0.0052 -­‐0.0119 -­‐0.0021 0.0063
(0.0089) (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0135)
State	  Average	  Electricity	  Rate 0.0037 -­‐0.0006 0.0069 0.0082 *
(0.0034) * (0.0049) (0.0045) (0.0047)
Corporate	  Income	  Tax	  per	  $1000	  Personal	  Income 0.0202 0.0218 0.0156 0.0376 **
(0.0107) (0.0148) (0.0141) (0.0154)
Individual	  Income	  Tax	  per	  $1000	  Personal	  Income 0.0051 ** 0.0075 ** 0.0048 0.0012
(0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0034)
Property	  Tax	  Per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐0.0029 -­‐0.0031 0.0003 -­‐0.0089 **
(0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0045)
Spend	  on	  Higher	  Education	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐0.0103 ** -­‐0.0240 *** -­‐0.0018 -­‐0.0033
(0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0075) (0.0076)
Spend	  on	  K12	  Education	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income 0.0091 ** 0.0080 0.0129 ** 0.0038
(0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0064)
Welfare	  Programs	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐0.0087 *** -­‐0.0050 -­‐0.0071 -­‐0.0017
(0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0048)
Highways/Roads	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income 0.0082 0.0180 * 0.0032 0.0002
(0.0082) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0118)
Corrections	  Per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐0.0219 -­‐0.0329 -­‐0.0228 -­‐0.0356
(0.0192) (0.0246) (0.0249) (0.0300)
Beacon	  Hill	  Comp	  Index 0.0256 0.0458 0.0406 -­‐0.0105
(0.0288) (0.0375) (0.0399) (0.0434)
Share	  of	  State	  Legislature	  Held	  by	  Democrats 0.0008 0.0006 0.0018 -­‐0.0015
(0.0017) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0025)
Rate	  of	  Veto	  by	  Governor 0.0010 0.0046 0.0005 -­‐0.0007
(0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0035)
Neighbors 1.4308 *** 1.4736 *** 1.2230 *** 1.0212 ***
(0.0509) (0.0651) (0.0695) (0.0750)
Intercept -­‐16.7405 *** -­‐17.3599 *** -­‐17.3583 *** -­‐17.8971 ***
(0.0434) (0.1495) (0.2778) (0.2534)
Pseudo	  R2 0.0373 0.0594 0.0479 0.0357
Standard	  error	  in	  parentheses.
***:	  	  Significant	  at	  99.0%
**:	  	  	  	  Significant	  at	  95.0%	  
*:	  	  	  	  	  	  Significant	  at	  90.0%
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All	  
Manufactu
rers
Low	  R&D	  
Manufactu
rers
Medium	  
R&D	  
Manufactu
ers
High	  R&D	  
Manufactu
ring
State's	  Share	  of	  US	  Manufacturing	  GDP 1.16E-­‐09 * 4E-­‐10 1.37E-­‐09 ** 0.005417 **
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0026)
Share	  of	  State	  Employment	  in	  Manufacturing -­‐1.26E-­‐09 -­‐2E-­‐10 -­‐1.06E-­‐09 -­‐0.006224 *
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0037)
Compensation	  per	  Job	  in	  Manufacturing -­‐1.5E-­‐10 5E-­‐10 -­‐4.2E-­‐10 -­‐0.000272
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0014)
Union	  Membership	  Rate 2.47E-­‐09 *** 2E-­‐09 * 2.14E-­‐09 *** 0.004167 **
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0019)
Unemployment	  Rate 1.58E-­‐09 1.7E-­‐09 -­‐1E-­‐11 0.006368
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0072)
Share	  of	  Population	  25+	  Years	  Old	  with	  at	  Least	  a	  Bachelor's	  Degree -­‐5.4E-­‐10 -­‐1E-­‐09 -­‐1.3E-­‐10 0.001608
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0035)
State	  Average	  Electricity	  Rate 3.8E-­‐10 -­‐1E-­‐10 4.3E-­‐10 0.002098 *
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0012)
Corporate	  Income	  Tax	  per	  $1000	  Personal	  Income 2.08E-­‐09 * 1.8E-­‐09 9.6E-­‐10 0.009668 **
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0040)
Individual	  Income	  Tax	  per	  $1000	  Personal	  Income 5.3E-­‐10 ** 6E-­‐10 2.9E-­‐10 0.000318
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0009)
Property	  Tax	  Per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐3E-­‐10 -­‐3E-­‐10 2E-­‐11 -­‐0.002295 **
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0012)
Spend	  on	  Higher	  Education	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐1.06E-­‐09 ** -­‐2E-­‐09 * -­‐1.1E-­‐10 -­‐0.000842
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0020)
Spend	  on	  K12	  Education	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income 9.4E-­‐10 ** 7E-­‐10 7.9E-­‐10 ** 0.000975
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0017)
Welfare	  Programs	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐9E-­‐10 *** -­‐4E-­‐10 -­‐4.4E-­‐10 -­‐0.000434
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0012)
Highways/Roads	  per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income 8.4E-­‐10 1.5E-­‐09 1.9E-­‐10 0.000061
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0030)
Corrections	  Per	  $1000	  of	  Personal	  Income -­‐2.25E-­‐09 -­‐2.8E-­‐09 -­‐1.4E-­‐09 -­‐0.00917
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0077)
Beacon	  Hill	  Comp	  Index 2.64E-­‐09 3.8E-­‐09 2.49E-­‐09 -­‐0.002697
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0112)
Share	  of	  State	  Legislature	  Held	  by	  Democrats 8E-­‐11 1E-­‐10 1.1E-­‐10 -­‐0.000395
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007)
Rate	  of	  Veto	  by	  Governor 1E-­‐10 4E-­‐10 3E-­‐11 -­‐0.000188
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0009)
Standard	  error	  in	  parentheses.
***:	  	  Significant	  at	  99.0%
**:	  	  	  	  Significant	  at	  95.0%	  
*:	  	  	  	  	  	  Significant	  at	  90.0%
Table	  4.	  Marginal	  Effects	  at	  the	  Means
